Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech: The Livingston Shirt and Peerless Plywood Cases by Kovar, Allan E.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1954 Article 3 
Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech: The Livingston Shirt and 
Peerless Plywood Cases 
Allan E. Kovar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Allan E. Kovar, Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech: The Livingston Shirt and Peerless Plywood Cases, 3 
DePaul L. Rev. 184 (1954) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol3/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
REAPPRAISAL OF EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH:
THE LIVINGSTON SHIRT AND PEERLESS
PLYWOOD CASES
E. ALLAN KOVAR
NSPIRING heated charges from union spokesmen of approving
compulsory "brainwashing sessions" and capitulating to anti-union
forces, the newly constituted National Labor Relations Board
has re-examined the Board's controversial Bonwit-Teller doctrine,
scrapped one-half of it, and substituted a new administrative rule ap-
plicable only to representation cases.
Under the original doctrine, the Board had previously held that
an employer's use of company time and property to deliver a speech
to its employees before a certification election urging employee
rejection of the union, while denying the union an equal opportunity
to address the employees on company time and property, not only
was grounds for setting the subsequent election aside, but also con-
stituted an unfair labor practice.
In Matter of Livingston Shirt Co.,' the majority of the Board2 held
that, absent a broad no-solicitation rule (where union solicitation is
prohibited at all times on company property), an employer does not
commit an unfair labor practice by making a pre-election speech on
company time and premises and denying the union's request for an
opportunity to reply. In a companion case, Matter of Peerless Ply-
wood Co.,3 the Board majority held that such employer action did not
constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the election and established
a new rule whereby both employer and union are prohibited from
making speeches on company time within twenty-four hours of an
election.
133 L.R.R.M. 1156, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1953).
2Chairman Farmer, Member Rodgers with Member Peterson concurring in the
result; Member Murdock dissenting.
3 33 L.R.R.M. 1151, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1953).
MR. KOVAR is associated with the Chicago firm of Seyfartb, Shaw & Fairweather,
and is active in labor relations work, principally as a representative of management.
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Immediately following the release of these rulings, CIO General
Counsel Arthur J. Goldberg issued an official statement in which
he charged that these decisions sanctioned compulsory "brain wash-
ing sessions," constituted anti-labor amendments to the Taft-Hartley
Act by process of administrative interpretation, and were incom-
patible with basic American principles.4 He stated that even the Taft-
Hartley Act, prior to these decisions, required an employer to give
the union an opportunity to reply on company time and property.
The reaction of the legal department of the AFL was equally
denunciatory:
The National Labor Relations Board in its decisions in Livingston Shirt
Corp. and Peerless Plywood Co. has reversed precedents standing throughout
the eighteen years of the Board's history by now permitting employers to
make anti-union speeches before captive audiences on company time. The new
majority ruling appears to be a capitulation to the demand of anti-union em-
ployers and attorneys made in the committee hearings at the last session of
the Congress.5
Board Member Rodgers publicly took exception to these charges
and countered by stating:
In some quarters, these decisions have been characterized as "legislating"
by the Board. This, in my opinion, is a false and hollow charge, based on
emotion and not on fact....
Indeed, if any unauthorized legislative activity has been indulged in, it has
not been indulged in by the present Board. I took an oath to administer this
statute. I did not take an oath to accept and administer any modifications, un-
seen provisos or unsound interpretations which may have become engrafted
upon it.6
Is there any substance to the union charges, and, if so, to what
extent? Has the Board reversed precedent of eighteen years' standing?
How exactly has the Board changed its prior decision in regard to
employer speeches and what is its present position? And, finally, are
the Livingston Shirt and Peerless Plywood cases indicative of a new
anti-labor animus pervading the Board?
To attempt an answer to these questions, it is necessary, at the
outset, to review the history of an employer's right to make known
4 248 Daily Lab. Rep. A-3, December 22, 1953, Statement of Arthur J. Goldberg,
CIO General Counsel.
5 249 Daily Lab. Rep. A-2, December 23, 1953, Statement of AFL Attorneys Albert
Woll, Herbert Thatcher, and James Glenn.
6From an address to the National Retail Dry Goods Association on January 12,
1954.
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his opinion regarding the union to his employees as construed by
Congress, the Board and the courts.7
In its early years under the Wagner Act, the Board interpreted
the statutory prohibition against employer interference with his em-
ployees' right of self-organization8 as requiring absolute neutrality on
the part of the employer. Thus, any employer expression of opinion
unfavorable to unionism was held to be unfair interference.9 This
position was founded upon the theory that an employer's economic
control over his employees was so great that even an apparently in-
nocuous statement of opinion by an employer assumed enormous
coercive significance over his employees.10
While the judiciary, by and large, appeared more concerned than
the Board with the constitutional right of the employer to speak,1
7 This subject is not without previous comment. As to the early position of the
Board and the judiciary, see 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1941); Daykin, The Employer's
Right of Free Speech in Industry Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 Ill.
L. Rev. 185 (1945); 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 104 (1946); Sinsheimer, Employer Free
Speech, A Comparative Analysis, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 617 (1947). For comment
at time of the Bonwit-Teller case, see 65 Harv. L. Rev. 695 (1952); 61 Yale L.J. 1066
(1952). For more recent analysis concerning the impact of Section 8(c) and the
expanded Bonwit-Teller doctrine, see Shair, Is the Captive Audience Doctrine Back?,
3 Lab. L.J. 475 (1952); Spanbock, Employer Speechmaking, 4 Lab. L.J. 474 (1953);
Elkouri, Employer Free Speech, 4 Lab. L.J. 78 (1953).
8 "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title; . . ." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1947).
9 Matter of Citizen News Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1940); Matter of Nebel Knitting
Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 284 (1938).
10In the Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 125, (1938)
it was stated:
"In considering the effect of the employer's conduct upon the self organization of
employees, there must be borne in mind the control wielded by the employer over
his employees-a control which results from the employees' complete dependence
upon their jobs, generally their only means of livelihood and economic existence.
As the natural result of the employer's economic power, employees are alertly
responsive to the slightest suggestion of the employer. Activities, innocuous and
without significance, as between two individuals economically independent of each
other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous significance and heighten to
proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in his relationship with
his employees. .. ."
This position was expained somewhat more bluntly by one writer, as follows:
"Freedom of speech is possible only among those who approximate each other
in equality of position. When an employer addresses himself to his employees on
the subject of unionism, orally or in writing, directly or through some mouthpiece,
economic compulsion comes in through the door and freedom of speech flies out
the window." Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works 79-80
(1940).
11 NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages, 99 F. 2d 153 (C.A. 9th, 1938); Jefferson Electric
Co. v. NLRB, 102 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 7th, 1939).
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the courts agreed that statements amounting to interference were not
so protected. 12 The courts differed as to what constituted unlawful
interference, 8 but the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in NLRB v. Federbusbh4 was regarded by many as having
settled the matter in favor of the Board's view that any employer
opinion unfavorable to unionization was inherently coercive because
of the employer's economic control over his employees. In 1941, how-
ever, the Supreme Court, in the case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric
Power Co.,' 5 announced that the First Amendment protected an
employer in the expression of his opinions to his employees so long
as such expression was not coercive in itself, or "part of a coercive
course of conduct." Subsequently, in NLRB v. American Tube Bend-
ing Co.,'" the Second Circuit reversed its Federbush decision and
held that an employer's speech, delivered on the eve of an election,
was privileged under the First Amendment.
The Board thereafter pursued a "pattern of coercive conduct"
theory in determining the effect of an employer's speech opposing
employee selection of a union.17 Its approach veered in the direction
of looking to the over-all course of conduct of an employer to
determine if an otherwise uncoercive speech might assume coercive
import in the light of the employer's pattern of conduct. In practice,
however, it became apparent that the Board was not readily surrender-
ing its view that employer speech is inherently coercive, for the
Board found constructive coercion in any employer expression of
opinion which followed alleged unfair practices by the employer.
Court acceptance of the Board's approach, however, was cool.'8
The Board then took a new approach. In Matter of Clark Bros.
12 Texas & New Orleans Rr.Co. v. Broth. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1930) (construing Railway Labor Act of 1926); Midland Steel Products Co.
v. NLRB, 113 F. 2d 800 (C.A. 6th, 1940).
18 Midland Steel Products Co. v. NLRB, 113 F. 2d 800 (C.A. 6th, 1940) (com-
plusion rather than influence); NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F. 2d 221 (C.A.
3d, 1940) (design to discourage unionization).
14 121 F. 2d 954 (C.A. 2d, 1941). Contra, NLRB v. Citizens News Co., 134 F. 2d
962 (C.A. 9th, 1943).
15 314 U.S. 469 (1941). 16 134 F. 2d 993 (C.A. 2d, 1943).
17 Matter of J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880 (1944); Matter of Goodall Co.,
68 N.L.R.B. 252 (1946).
18 Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 922 (C.A. 3d, 1944); NLRB
v. Brown-Brockmeyer Co., 143 F. 2d 537 (C.A. 6th, 1944); NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis
& Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (C.A. 8th 1944). But see Peter J. Schweitzer, Inc. v. NLRB,
144 F. 2d 520 (App. D.C., 1944).
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Co., Inc.,9 it was held that an employer's anti-union speech to his
employees, during working hours and only one hour before an
election, constituted an unfair labor practice because the employer
had
... exercised its superior economic power in coercing its employees to listen
to speeches relating to their organizational activities, and thereby independent-
ly violated Section 8(1) of the Act.20
This was considered the birth of the "captive audience" doctrine. 1
Again it was apparent that the Board was still of the belief that
when an employer addressed his employees, ". . . economic com-
pulsion comes in through the door and freedom of speech flies out the
window. '22 The new approach was an attempt to weaken this eco-
nomic compulsion by prohibiting the speech at the situs of the
employer's control during the hours such control was exercised.
On appeal from the Board's ruling in the Clark Bros. case the Court
of Appeals held that it was not necessary to lay down so broad a
rule that compulsory attendance at an anti-union speech on company
premises and time is itself an unfair practice. The court stated:
We should hesitate to hold that he [the employer] may not do this on
company time and pay, providing a similar opportunity to address them were
accorded representatives of the union.23
19 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
20 Member Reilly dissented, stating:
"But this decision is more retrogressive than the general run in that it finds the
mere fact that the employees were assembled in the plant during working time
to listen to anti-CIO campaign speeches of respondent's officials was itself a violation
of the Act, the theory being that the employees were not at liberty during working
hours to avoid hearing the speeches. It must be remembered, however, that these
were the same circumstances under which the crucial speech in American Tube
Bending case was made and virtually the identical argument in support of the
Board's disapproval of it was urged unsuccessfully upon the courts. It ignores the
fact that the whole Board doctrine of employer neutrality developed with respect
to employers using the plant facilities as channels for their propaganda. It was this
doctrine of the Board that the courts repudiated, not some notion that an employer
did not have access to public media of expression, for no Board decision had ever
held this to be illegal per se."
21 Actually, the factor of an employer speech being made during the working
hours had been previously noted by the Board, but never considered independently
as an unfair practice. Matter of Thompson Products Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 1381 (1945);
Matter of Wennonah Cotton Mills Co., Inc., 63 N.L.R.B. 143 (1945); Matter of
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945); Matter of Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 244 (1946). In the Montgomery Ward case, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically denied the efficacy of this factor. 157 F. 2d
486 (1946).
22 Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra note 10.
23 163 F. 2d 373 (C.A. 2d, 1947). The italicized portion of the quotation was a
harbinger of things to come.
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The Board's findings were upheld, however, on the theory that the
evidence showed an aggressive anti-union campaign, of which the
employer's speech was the culmination.
Between the time of the Board's decision and the Second Circuit's
review thereof, Congress stepped into the picture. Concerned over
the apparent subjugation of the rights of the employer in attempting
to foster the rights of the employee, without attendant responsibilities
upon the latter, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. With respect
to the free speech issue, the Clark Bros. decision was cited as being too
restrictive of the right of free speech,24 and Section 8 (c) was added
to the Act, providing that the expression of views, arguments or
opinion ".... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice ... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit.' 25 It was clear that a majority of Congress
wished to prevent future application of the"captive audience" doctrine
and to restrict the finding of an unfair practice regarding speech to
the contents of the speech itself.
Thereafter, the Board appeared to withdraw the "captive audience"
theory as a basis for finding an unfair labor practice. In Matter of
Babcock & Wilcox, the Board held that the "captive audience" doc-
trine no longer existed as a basis for finding unfair labor practices.26
Several years later, the Regional Director for the Second Region
recommended that an election be set aside in Matter of S & S Cor-
rugated Paper Machinery Co.,27 partly on the grounds that the em-
24 Senate Report No. 105 on S. 1126, at p. 24-25. There were those who opposed
this view, and the House Minority Report (H. Rep. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, at 84)
states: "Here again, the laudable purpose of protecting free speech cloaks an evil
design to encourage unfair labor practices by employers."
2549 Star. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (c) (1947).
2677 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). The Board stated:
"With respect to the 'compulsory audience' aspect of the speeches, the trial ex-
aminer concluded from all the evidence that the notices of the meetings as well as
the oral instructions given to the employees concerning these meetings removed the
element of choice from the employees, and, in effect, compelled them to attend in
a violation of the act. In reaching this conclusion, the trial examiner relied upon the
'compulsory audience' doctrine enunciated in Matter of Clark Bros. Co., Inc. How-
ever, the language of Section 8(c) of the amended Act, and its legislative history,
make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis
for finding unfair labor practices in circumstances such as this record discloses.
Even assuming, therefore, without deciding, that the respondent required its em-
ployees to attend and listen to the speeches, we conclude that it did not thereby
violate the act."
Also see Matter of Fontaine Converting Works, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1948);
Matter of Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948).
27 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
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ployer had subjected his employees to a "captive meeting" and there-
after ignored the union's request for a like opportunity to address the
employees. The Board held that this theory was untenable in view
of its Babcock & Wilcox decision. The Board stated:
In that case [Babcock & Wilcox] the Board held that Section 8(c) of the
amended act and its legislative history make it clear that the "compulsory
audience" doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for find-
ing unfair labor practices, under circumstances substantially similar to those
presented in this case. The decision in the Babcock & Wilcox case is con-
trolling here. On the facts revealed by the Regional Director's reports in this
case, the "captive audience" aspect of the Employer's speeches, otherwise pro-
tected by Section 8(c) of the amended act, cannot form the basis for a finding
that the employer, by denying the Petitioner an equal opportunity to use its
facilities and time, has interfered with the employee's free choice of a bar-
gaining representative. The petitioner's objections to the conduct of the
election on this ground are therefore overruled. (Italics added)
But, then came the Bonwit-Teller28 case. The Board, overruling the
S & S Corrugated case, held that the employer's refusal to allow the
union an opportunity to speak to the employees on company time,
where the employer made such an address, constituted an unfair labor
practice and also interfered with the election so that it should be
set aside.
It is important to note that the Board advanced two theories in
explaining its holding. The first was that the refusal constituted a dis-
criminatory application of the broad no-solicitation rule which the
employer had in effect. The Board held:
. ..It cannot be denied that, while the rule was justified and lawful, the
organization of the Respondent's employees had to be conducted under a
practical disadvantage which we have not sanctioned in other types of business
operations. We believe the special privilege of department stores to promulgate
the broadest type of rule against union solicitation gives rise to an equal
obligation to assure that such rules are enforced with an even hand. For an
employer, in the face of such a rule, to utilize its premises for the purpose of
urging its employees to reject the union, and then to deny the union's re-
quest to present its case to the employees under the same circumstances, is an
abuse of that privilege which, we believe, the statute does not intend us to
license.
The second theory advanced was that, regardless of the existence
(or lack thereof) of a no-solicitation rule, an employer may not deny
a union the opportunity to address the employees on company time
where the employer has so spoken. In establishing this "equal op-
28 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
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portunity" theory, the Board reasoned that Section 7 of the Act
guaranteed to employees
...the right to hear both sides of the story under circumstances which rea-
sonably approximate equality.
From this premise, the Board concluded:
...that an employer who chooses to use his premises to assemble his em-
ployees and speak against a union may not deny that union's reasonable re-
quest for the same opportunity to present its case, where the circumstances
are such that only by granting such request will the employees have a reason-
able opportunity to hear both sides.29
Again it was the Second Circuit which reviewed the Board's posi-
tion. 0 This court upheld the Board's finding, solely on the basis of
the "first theory," i.e., a discriminatory application of the no-solicita-
tion rule. The court stated:
As we have indicated above, the violation here was the discriminatory ap-
plication of the no-solicitation rule. If Bonwit-Teller were to abandon that
rule, we do not think it would then be required to accord the union a similar
opportunity to address the employees each time Rudolph [employer] made
an anti-union speech. Nothing in the Act nor in reason compels such "an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" result so long as the avenues of communica-
tion are kept open to both sides.3 '
Following its Bonwit-Teller decision, the Board began anew its
efforts to protect employees from the coercion it believed to be
inherent in an employer's address to his employees. In Matter of
Biltmore Mfg. Co.,32 the Board relied solely upon the "equal op-
portunity theory" (a no-solicitation rule not being present) in
29 The Board made specific reference to the Second Circuit's dictum in the Clark
Bros. case, 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). Member Reynolds dissented, stating:
"... that this freedom of speech [guaranteed in Section 8(c)] encompassed the
right to address employees in the plant, as did Respondent's president, is beyond
question. Nowhere in the act or in its legislative history, however, does it appear
that a concomitant of this right is the obligation to provide a forum of debate for
unions. Indeed, hinging an employer's right to speak upon his readiness to make
available the means by which his arguments, views, and opinions can be nullified,
effectively emasculates Section 8(c) as it applies to the right of an employer to
address his employees."
8OBonwit-Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F. 2d 640 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
81 Chief Judge Swan dissented, stating:
"It is clear from the legislative history, which criticized as too restrictive the deci-
sion in Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, that Congress intended the employer to have
the right to address his employees on company time and property. There is no
suggestion that if he exercised the right he must accord to union representatives a
similar opportunity."
3297 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
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setting aside an election.83 In Matter of Bernardin Bottle Cap Co., 4
the Board again set aside an election because of the employer's refusal
to allow the union to reply to his address on company time. The
Board noted:
The critical question here, as it was in the two aforementioned cases, is
whether the circumstances were such that only by granting the Union's re-
quest for use of the same forum could the employees have a reasonable op-
portunity to hear both sides of the issue on which they were about to vote.85
This critical question would appear on its face to be a factual con-
dition upon which the application of the doctrine must depend. Thus,
it would appear that the Board recognized the employer's con-
stitutional and statutory right to speak, but was establishing a reason-
able limitation thereon where the facts were such that otherwise the
employees would be denied their right to hear both sides. For all
practical purposes, however, no such factual condition existed. The
Board interpreted the "reasonable opportunity to hear both sides" as
requiring the union's opportunity to be one "under circumstances
which reasonably approximate equality" to those utilized by the
employer, and approximate equality was only to be found where
the union was allowed an equal opportunity to speak on company
88The Board stated:
"The Board has recently dealt with this question in Bonwit-Teller, Inc. The
Board there found that when the employer chose to deliver a speech to its employees,
it could not lawfully deny the union's reasonable request for an opportunity to reply
under similar circumstances. We affirm that holding here .... It is true, as pointed
out by our dissenting colleague, that the record in this case does not disclose the
existence of a general no-solicitation rule and its discriminatory application as was
found in the Bonwit-Teller case. It does reveal, however, that at the very time the
Employer addressed the employees on company time and property, it denied union
spo kesmen the similar opportunity. Certainly, the same legal consequences should
flow from this conduct as would flow from the discriminatory application of an
established rule against solicitation. For, in either case, the employer is discriminating
in favor of anti-union adherence to the serious detriment of union adherents."
Where an employer had a limited no-solicitation rule, proscribing solicitation only
during working hours, the Board held, in setting aside the election, that the em-
ployer's address during working time was a discriminatory application of that
rule. Matter of Higgins, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 829 (1952); Matter of J. J. Newberr7
Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1952); Matter of National Screw & Mfg. Co. of Cali
101 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1952).
8497 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1952).
8 To this same effect, see Matter of Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B.
1483 (1952); Matter of Muter Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 287 (1952); Matter of Foreman &
Clark, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 40 (1952); Matter of Onondaga Pottery Co., 100 N.L.R.B.
1143 (1952); Matter of Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 484 (1952);
Matter of Mass. Motor Car Co., Inc., 30 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1952).
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time and property. 6 Thus by definition, the Board eliminated the
supposed condition.
The "reasonable opportunity to hear both sides" was also found
by the Board to be denied per se where the employer's speech was
so timed as to preempt the last opportunity for discussion, thereby
making the presentation of the union's view under equal circum-
stances impossible.37 By these expansions, the Board veered dangerous-
ly close to its old "captive audience" doctrine. While not denying the
right to speak on company time and property, the Board grafted on
to the right the condition that equal opportunity must be granted
to the union.
These cases in which the Board applied its "equal opportunity
theory," with the above described expansions, were all representation
cases in which the Board set aside an election because of the alleged
interference.3 8 However, in Matter of Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc.,3 9
the Board was faced with its first unfair practice case involving the
36 Matter of Onondaga Pottery Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1952); Matter of Foreman
& Clark, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 40 (1952).
One qualification to this position utilized by the Board was that the union must
make a request of the employer for an opportunity to reply before the principle
enunciated in the Bonwit-Teller case could be applied. Matter of Silver Knit Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 422 (1952); Matter of R. H. Osbrink, 32 L.R.R.M. 1043, 104
N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1953).
37 Matter of Hills Bros. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 964 (1952); Matter of John Irving
Stores, 101 N.L.R.B. 82 (1952). Even where the employer presented evidence that
the union still had time to address the employees had it requested to do so, the
Board found that the facts indicated too great an inconvenience to the union and
the employees to attempt a reply in the brief period of time left between the
speech and the election. Matter of Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 32 L.R.R.M. 1356,
105 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (1953).
Qualifications to this preemption theory were also applied. In Matter of Reeves
Instrument Corp., 32 L.R.R.M. 1130, 104 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1953), the Board held
that the union's knowledge of the likelihood that the employer might make a last
minute speech (pamphlets were distributed warning of such a stratagem) placed the
burden of making a request to reply upon the union. Failing this, the union could
not invoke the preemption theory when in fact the employer did address the
employees shortly before quitting time the day before the election. Also, in Matter
of Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 32 L.R.R.M. 1445, 106 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (1953), the
Board held that an employer address made at the close of the working day prior
to election day, where the election was not to be held until the close of the day, did
not preempt the union's opportunity to reply.
38The Board had earlier pointed out that conduct which may not constitute an
unfair practice may nevertheless constitute grounds to set aside an election. Matter
of General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). As to the free speech problem this
placed the Board in an apparently unembarrassed position of construing "legally non-
coercive language as creative of an illegally coercive atmosphere." See 58 Yale
L. J. 165 (1948).
39 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953).
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employer speech issue since the Bonwit-Teller case. The entire Board
agreed that a refusal to allow the union an opportunity to reply was
sufficient to support a finding of an 8 (a) (1) violation where a no-
solicitation rule was in effect. (This was a limited no-solicitation rule,
unlike the Bonwit-Teller broad rule, only prohibiting solicitation
during working hours.) However, the Board split four to one in
applying the doctrine where the employer did not have a no-solicita-
tion rule.40 The majority of the Board applied its "equal opportunity
theory" and held that the Act was thereby violated, stating:
It is clear that where an employer chooses to enter the representation
campaign and utilizes company time and property to present his views, he
uses a "privileged and effective forum" which he may not in fairness refuse
to the opposition upon request. V'e believe that this refusal, without more,
prevents the employees from hearing "both sides of the story under circum-
stances which reasonably approximate equality." It follows that in these cir-
cumstances a refusal alone constitutes interference with the employees' free-
dom of choice, regardless of the existence of other media of communication
between the union and the employees. Accordingly, we find that the [em-
ployers'] use of company time and property for electioneering speeches to
employee assemblies, while simultaneously denying the union the same forum
for a like use, interferes with the right of employees freely to select or reject
union representation and constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.4
1
40Two different employers were here involved.
41 The Board explained its position in some detail:
"In the original Bonwit Teller case, the Board utilized as the basis for its decision
both the disparate use of a no-solicitation rule, and the theory that 'the right of
employees, guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, freely to select or reject representa-
tion by a labor organization necessarily encompasses the right to hear both sides
of the story under circumstances which reasonably approximate equality.' The
question presented is whether the latter theory alone is sufficient basis for a finding
that the refusal by an employer to accord a union equal opportunity to present its
case prior to an election violates Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. We believe this ques-
tion must be answered affirmatively despite any dicta or views to the contrary which
may be found in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Bonwit-Teller case....
"In reaching this conclusion, we believe that our finding is supported not only
by theoretical consideration but also by the realities to be found in union organiza-
tion campaigns. Thus, it is apparent that printed materials and individual solicita-
tions neither reach the full audience that the employer can insure by this control
over the working time; nor do they approach the persuasive power of an em-
ployer's presentation. Soliciting employees on the employer's premises, even when
not precluded by a no-solicitation rule, can not substitute for the systematic argu-
ments presented orally to an employee assembly. Soliciting employees off the
premises can seldom be extensive, due to both time limitations and geographical
diffusion of employees. Consistent with the foregoing, we find that solicitation and
extensive use of other approaches to the employees by the union does not qualify
the principle involved herein, and we find no merit in the [employers'] contentions
in that regard. The conclusion is inevitable that, where an employer uses company
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Chairman Herzog dissented, questioning the breadth of the Board's
application of the Bonwit-Teller doctrine in representation questions,
and, more specifically, stating:
The spirit and legislative history of Section 8(c) do not seem to me to
encourage this Board to find that an employer's insistence on monopolizing
his own property as a platform constitutes a violation of the amended Act,
absent that discrimination which arises whenever he treats his no-solicitation
policy as a one-way street.
The second court test for the broad "equal opportunity" theory
arose in NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co. 42 The Board had based
its unfair practice finding upon both theories advanced in the Bonwit-
Teller case. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made it
clear that its original affirmance of the Board position was limited
solely to the first theory, and again denied the efficacy of the Board's
broad theory.48
The Board reaffirmed its Metropolitan Auto decision in at least
two subsequent cases before the court's decision was handed down.44
It was clear at this point that the Board felt that if any employer
spoke to his employees on company time and property, he must ac-
cede to the union's request for an equal opportunity or be guilty of
unlawful interference with the employees' rights. It would appear that
the Board's old distrust of employer speechmaking had been applied
in a different form. The right to speak itself could no longer be denied
the employer, but its "evil" the Board attempted to alleviate by con-
ditioning the "right" upon the granting of an equal right to the
union.
As Eisenhower appointees replaced retiring Board members in
time and premises to make a preelection speech, he must permit, upon request, an
equal forum to the union spokesman.
"Upon the basis of this principle, the Board has set aside elections in a succession
of cases which involved conduct by employers identical to that presented in the
instant case. We find that the same considerations which impelled us to set aside
elections in those representation proceedings are applicable in finding a violation of
Section 8(a) (1) herein."
42205 F. 2d 45 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
4 Chief Judge Swan concurred in the result as he felt bound by the majority
decision in the Bonwit-Teller case. However, Judge Frank stated, in his concurrence
with the result of the decision, that he did not join in the statement that the Board's
second theory was without merit. He noted it was not necessary to decide the
issue in this case, but opined: "Much can be said for an opposite conclusion." Three
separate opinions were thus represented on the court.
44 Matter of Seamprufe, Inc., 31 L.R.R.M. 1522, 103 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1953); Matter
of Onondaga Pottery Co., 31 L.R.R.M. 1568, 103 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1953).
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1953," a reappraisal of many of the Board's policies was begun. The
Livingston Shirt Co.46 case gave the newly constituted Board its first
opportunity to examine its predecessor Board's application and ex-
pansion of the Bonwit-Teller doctrine. Respondent Livingston had in
effect a limited no-solicitation rule. Its president addressed the em-
ployees during working hours several days before an election and
refused the union's request to do likewise. The Board majority
rejected the "equal opportunity theory" of the Bon'wit-Teller case,
reasoning that Section 8(c) guarantees the right of free speech to the
employer, and: "If the privilege of free speech is to be given real
meaning, it cannot be qualified by grafting upon it conditions which
are tantamount to negation. ' 47 The majority noted that the Bonwit-
Teller doctrine was the "... discredited Clark Bros. doctrine in scant
disguise."
The Board's ruling in the Livingston case cannot be regarded as
having obliterated the Bonwit-Teller doctrine. For if Section 8(c)
disallows the grafting of administrative conditions upon the right of
free speech, then logically, the limited Bonwit-Teller doctrine, which
the Board affirmed, is equally as unfounded as the broad doctrine. If
a broad no-solicitation rule is lawful (as it is in the case of department
stores) ,48 then isn't it clear that conditioning an employer's right to
speak upon the granting of an equal right to the union, where the
employer has such a lawful rule, is just as much a grafting process
as that condemned? Viewed another way, is a refusal to allow the
union an opportunity to speak during working time any less dis-
crimination where the employer speaks during working time and
45 Farmer replaced Herzog, Rodgers replaced Houston, and Stlyes resigned.
4033 L.R.R.M. 1156, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1953).
47 The Board further stated:
"In the original Bonwit Teller case, the Board, as then constituted, found that
a 'fundamental consideration' in support of its decision was the right of employees
under Section 7 to 'hear both sides under circumstances which approximate
equality.' We have no quarrel with this principle, but we think that it is to be
achieved not by administratively grafting new limbs on the statute, but by strict
enforcement of those provisions of the statute which afford employers the right of
free and uncoercive speech and grants employees the protected right to join labor
unions free from coercion or discrimination. The majority in Bonwit-Teller did
not cite, nor have we been able to find, any support in the statutory language or
legislative history for holding that the employer who exercised his own admitted
rights under the statute thereby incurs an affirmative obligation to donate his
premises and working time to the union for the purpose of propagandizing the
employees."
48 See Matter of Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952).
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has a limited no-solicitation rule, than is such a refusal where there
is a broad no-solicitation rule?
It appears that the Board did not deny its authority to attach con-
ditions to employer speech, but rather, re-appraised the grounds for
such conditioning. Whereas the former Board had stated that its
requirement that an employer grant equal opportunity to the union
was only to be invoked where necessary to allow the employee a
"reasonable opportunity to hear both sides," it was clear that the
Board arbitrarily held that it was always so necessary when the
employer spoke on company time. The present Board has not for-
saken the theory, but has forsaken the broad arbitrary rule. It has
applied the theory to those situations where the employer has in
effect a broad no-solicitation rule, and has thus attempted to equate
the right to organize and the right of free speech, thereby attempting
to protect the rights of both sides."'
In the Peerless Plywood" case, the majority established a new rule
prohibiting all addresses on company time and property within
twenty-four hours of an election. Violation of this new rule, the
Board held, constituted grounds for setting the election aside.
While admittedly a limitation upon the right to speak, this rule
does not provide one party an advantage at the expense of the other.
What deprivation there is, has been equally cast upon both sides.
As any arbitrary rule, it is subject to attack on the examples of its
application in extreme cases, but it represents an attempt to guarantee
the employees' rights with as little encroachment as possible upon
the rights of others.
Clearly, the Board has upset no precedent of eighteen years' stand-
ing. Upon reflection, it is evident that the charges of "brainwashing,"
"un-American" and the like were heated declamations of the moment.
More importantly, it is submitted that the Board's recent action in
the Livingston and Peerless cases is by no means "anti-labor." What
the Board has done is to cast aside an arbitrary rule which categorical-
ly announced that only by granting a union's request to speak on
company time and property, where the employer so spoke, could
the employees have a "reasonable opportunity to hear both sides."
It has restricted the encroachment of employers' right of free speech
49 It is submitted that Member Peterson's concurring opinion, in relying solely
upon the American Tube Bending decision to justify the result, is in no ways con-
trary to what the Board in reality held.
5033 L.R.R.M. 1151, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1953).
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to cases where the employees' right to organize has been seriously
restricted by the Board's recognition that in certain types of business
union solicitation would be too disruptive to be allowed at any time
on company property.
Eighteen years of controversy and litigation testify that the
balancing of employee rights of self-organization against employer
rights of free speech has been productive of numerous conflicting
doctrines and rules. The primary purpose of the Wagner Act was
to foster and protect employee organizational rights. This purpose
was not renounced by the Taft-Hartley Act, but rather Congress
therein attempted to equalize the responsibilities of the parties. In the
Peerless and Livingston cases, the present Board has attempted to rule
upon the employer free speech issue in light of the present legislation
rather than the old.
How long the rules thus established will prevail is speculative in
view of the current Congressional activity.5' Certainly so fundamental
a right as free speech should not be subject to the ebb and flow of
political tides represented in personnel changes on the Board. If
policy is to be revised, that is properly the function of Congress, not
the Board. While the presently constituted Board has attempted to
follow the general policy established by Congress in 1947, the tardi-
ness of such recognition should indicate to Congress that a more de-
tailed exposition of its policy regarding employer free speech is
necessary. Only in this way will employer and employee be able to
know their rights and responsibilities.
5i President Eisenhower recommended in his Taft-Hartley Act address to Congress
that the right of free speech should apply "equally to labor and management in
every aspect of their relationship." Senator Smith, Chairman of the Senate Labor
Committee, introduced a bill (S. 2650) in which it is provided that employer free
speech shall not be the basis for setting aside a representation question. Enactment
of this provision would at least terminate the Peerless 24 hour rule.
